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1. Introduction  
One of the most prominent methods for the appraisal of environmental changes and 
public projects in the environmental sector is the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM). 
Since it belongs to the class of stated-preference methods the validity of CVM survey 
results is under permanent discussion. In this paper we deal with a specific source of 
potential biases occurring in practical CVM studies: the effects of material incentives 
on respondent compliance and on stated willingness to pay.  
The CVM relies on interviews where a representative sample of all households 
affected by a certain public project is asked – among other things – their willingness 
to pay (WTP) for the realization of that project. These individual statements are then 
extrapolated to assess the social WTP for the project which is interpreted as the 
monetary value of the social benefits it creates. The social benefits can then be 
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compared to the project costs in order to decide if its realization is remunerative for 
society or not.  
For the reliability of CVM survey results it is necessary to keep the rejection rate as 
low as possible and to ensure that respondents consider the questions they are 
asked carefully and answer them truthfully. Especially in poor countries it has 
become customary to offer interviewees small gifts or small amounts of money to 
provide incentives for them to comply with these requirements. Therefore, the 
intentions behind such incentives are that we want people to comply with the 
interview request (i.e. minimize the rejection rate), to go to great intellectual efforts to 
answer all questions even if they have to think hard to answer them (i.e. minimize the 
item non-response rate), and answer the WTP question truthfully (i.e. minimize the 
elicitation bias).  
With introductory gifts (monetary or in-kind) we want to invoke feelings of gratitude on 
the side of the respondents to make them reciprocate the favor they have received: 
"Give and it will be given to you" (Luke 6:38). Unfortunately, we cannot tell in 
advance how exactly respondents will show their gratitude. Ideally all three of the 
above stated intended effects will be attained. People's natural desire to reciprocate 
favors they have received from others might lead them to agree to a CVM interview 
though they do not feel like it, it might make them think harder about our questions - 
but at the same time it might also induce them to state a higher than their true WTP 
for the suggested project in order to show their gratitude. This latter form of gratitude 
would lead to biased overall WTP and is, of course, not desired.  
Actually things are even more complicated. Already the basic question if a gift is 
helpful at all in triggering the motivation of respondents to answer CVM questions 
carefully is controversial. In a well-known series of articles, Bruno Frey and his 
coauthors showed theoretically and based on laboratory experiments that the intrinsic 
motivation for a certain task can be crowded out by providing extrinsic incentives 
(Frey 1994, Frey et al. 1996, Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997). Also in Gneezy and 
Rustichini (2000) and Gneezy et al. (2011), examples are given where the 
introduction of extrinsic incentives deteriorates the performance of certain tasks, 
especially if these tasks had been considered commendable or pro-social or simply a 
matter of civic duty before. Referring to a game-theoretic study by Liberman et al. 
(2004) they conclude: "Moving from no incentive to a positive incentive can 
dramatically change the framing of the interaction and shift an individual’s decision 
frame from social to monetary." (Gneezy et al. 2011, p. 200). Applying this insight to 
the CVM interview situation offering an extrinsic incentive might change people's 
whole view of the interview: without incentive they might consider it their civic duty to 
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support science by agreeing to the interview and help government make good 
decisions, but after they are offered an extrinsic incentive (money or in-kind) they 
look at it as a deal to which they agree only if the compensation balances their effort. 
Besides these framing effects also other psychological reasons might be responsible 
for adverse effects of gifting respondents. Interpreting the CVM interview as a kind of 
a principal-agent game where the interviewer is the principal who cannot be sure 
about the true mental efforts made by the respondent-agent in answering his 
questions, an extrinsic incentive might lead to the impression on the side of the agent 
that the principal does not trust his reliability and scrutiny without extra incentives. 
This might backfire in that the respondent feels offended by this suspected 
expression of distrust and lowers his efforts as a consequence (cf. Gneezy et al. 
2011, p. 192).  This leads us to  
Research question 1: Do extrinsic incentives trigger respondents' efforts in 
answering CVM questions?  
If we are determined to trigger respondents' motivation through extrinsic incentives, 
the question arises which kind of incentive is most suitable in the light of our three 
intentions stated above. Should we give money or a small in-kind gift? As Gneezy et 
al. (2011, p. 192) state: "Monetary incentives have two kinds of effects: the standard 
direct price effect, which makes the incentivized behavior more attractive, and an 
indirect psychological effect." While the psychological effect might counteract or not 
our intentions to increase respondents' scrutiny, the price effect always works into the 
right direction. This seems to speak in favor of money incentives. On the other hand 
Heyman and Ariely (2004) found in laboratory experiments where candidates had to 
perform seemingly dull tasks that candy worked better as an incentive than money. 
Gneezy et al. (2011, p. 201) also point out that your chances to get into bed with an 
attractive woman is typically not enhanced if you offer her money, an in-kind gift like a 
bunch of flowers might work much better in this context. This gives rise to  
Research question 2: What has a more favorable effect on respondents' 
diligence in answering CVM questionnaires, money or in-kind gifts?  
If you decide in favor of money incentives it is important to find the right amount. 
Gneezy et al. (2011, p. 191) state that "the basic 'law of behavior' is that higher 
incentives will lead to more effort and higher performance." But this 'law of behavior' 
does not represent a universal truth as the authors state shortly after. Also Gneezy 
and Rustichini (2000) report from experimental studies where they found that (i) both 
large and small monetary incentives reduced candidates' efforts as compared to a 
control group where no material incentives were provided and (ii) small monetary 
incentives reduced efforts more than larger payments. These – at first glance 
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counterintuitive – findings motivated the title of their article: "Pay enough or don’t pay 
at all". The reason for these results might again lie in the antagonism of the price 
effect and the psychological effects of monetary incentives. For low payments the 
adverse psychological effects dominate the price effect, while this imbalance is 
reversed as payments become larger. These findings lead to our third research 
question:  
Research question 3: Do large money incentives on the one hand and small 
money incentives on the other have different effects on respondents' diligence 
in answering CVM questionnaires?  
Analogously, regarding in-kind incentives we ask: 
Research question 4: Do expensive in-kind incentives on the one hand and 
less expensive in-kind incentives on the other have different effects on 
respondents' diligence in answering CVM questionnaires?  
As discussed above we do not want gifts or payments to influence respondents WTP 
statements because this would invalidate our survey results. This leads us to  
Research question 5: Do material incentives (monetary or in-kind) affect 
respondents' stated WTP for the public project under discussion?  
In a practical CVM study conducted in Xishuangbanna in southwest China we 
scrutinize these research questions in detail using field experiments. Applying 
altogether five different treatments (high and low money payments, high- and low-
priced in-kind gifts, no gift at all as a control treatment) we analyze the effects of 
different forms of gifts on respondents’ compliance on the one hand and on stated 
WTP for an environmental improvement (biodiversity preservation in Xishuangbanna) 
on the other. We find that all incentives under investigation increase respondents’ 
willingness to answer also intellectually demanding questions with the low monetary 
incentive performing best. None of the incentives leads to a significant increase in 
average stated WTP as compared to the reference sample. However, the low-value 
gift, though having the same monetary value as the low money payment, leads to a 
significant decrease of average stated WTP, which might mean that for some reason 
respondents felt offended by this gift. Further, a two-step Heckman regression 
analysis shows that monetary and in-kind gifts might both influence respondents’ 
inclination to state a positive WTP instead of zero. Considering the advantages and 
disadvantages of all kinds of incentives analyzed, our recommendation for future 
CVM studies is to offer respondents low money payments before the interview in 
order to trigger their compliance without influencing their WTP statements.  
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In the next section we will review the existing literature on reciprocity and incentives 
in surveys. In section 3 we describe our empirical study in Xishuangbanna and in 
section 4 we discuss our results. Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.  
 
2. Respondent incentives and reciprocity in surveys  
The reaction of survey participants to incentives provided for the participation in 
an interview has been studied both theoretically and empirically. After introducing 
some theoretical approaches to explain reciprocal behavior originating in survey 
methodology and game theory an overview of empirical findings on the effect of 
incentives in surveys is provided.   
 
2.1. Theoretical approaches to explain reciprocal behavior in surveys 
The methodological literature on respondent incentives in face-to-face, mail and 
telephone surveys basically distinguishes conditional from unconditional incentives 
on the one hand and categorizes cash payments and in-kind gifts on the other. An 
unconditional incentive is an upfront gift that is not linked to the completion of the 
survey interview, whereas a conditional incentive is handed over after the interview is 
completed as a kind of reward for the respondent’s effort. Sometimes an 
unconditional incentive is provided even a certain time before the actual survey 
interview is carried out. In this case a notification of the upcoming interview 
(regardless of its form) is sent to the respondent by mail and contains the money 
amount or in-kind gift.  
There are several theoretical approaches to explain the effect of incentives on 
respondents to a survey interview. Weinreb et al. (1998) maintain that the fact of 
gifting respondents to a survey triggers two things: Firstly, it stresses the instrumental 
nature of the interviewer-respondent relationship in the eyes of the latter and, 
secondly, it represents an attempt to ease the imbalance of that relationship. These 
authors argue that the relationship between interviewer and respondent is unequal 
because it is solely the interviewer (or rather the researcher) who imposes the rules 
of the interview and profits from its results. The incentive is therefore a means of 
reducing this inequality and thus to raise the position of the respondent. 
Consequently, one approach to theoretically explain incentive effects in surveys 
assumes that respondents conduct a rational cost-benefit analysis of the interview 
situation and take the incentive as a benefit of the completion of the interview (Biner 
and Kidd 1994). Since the incentive raises the benefits while the costs (in the form of 
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time spent and cognitive effort) remain unchanged, the likelihood of taking part in the 
survey rises. This theory would imply a linear relationship between the value of the 
incentive and the response rate of a survey, which is not unambiguously supported 
by the empirical literature (see below). Therefore, another explanation originates in 
social exchange theory, in which an incentive paid before the interview is regarded as 
an expression of trust of the interviewer. The fact that such a “token of appreciation” 
(Ryu et al. 2006) is provided places the survey in a social context and thus motivates 
the respondent to put more effort into answering the survey questions in exchange 
(Shettle and Mooney 1999). Related to this theory is the idea of the incentive 
invoking a norm of reciprocity (Gouldner 1960, Wetzels et al. 2008). After receiving 
the incentive the respondent feels compelled to return this favor by giving something 
back; he feels the “gratitude imperative” of receiving a gift (Schwartz 1967) and 
therefore responds to this expression of trust with higher effort and more willingness 
to comply with the request to take part in the survey.4  
Apart from the survey literature, several theoretical approaches to explain 
reciprocal behavior have been developed in the field of game theory. Individuals are 
ready to forgo part of their own benefit in order to respond to the (positive) behavior 
of others either because they have an aversion against inequity (Fehr and Schmidt 
1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) or because they react to the intentions of others 
(Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004, Rabin 1993). Further, this strand of literature 
explicitly distinguishes reciprocity from cooperation, retaliation and altruism. While 
cooperation or retaliation in repeated interactions is driven by the desire to increase 
future utility, reciprocity is a reaction to behavior in the past which is not necessarily 
motivated by further interactions in the future. Altruism is not triggered by past kind or 
unkind behavior but is rather a “form of unconditional kindness” (Fehr and Gächter 
2000). In a very detailed and most interesting survey on reciprocity, Kolm (2006) 
identifies three different reasons or motives for reciprocity: (1) "comparative, 
matching, compensatory, or balance reciprocity", where returning a favor received 
before aims at reestablishing a balance between two parties which has been 
disturbed by the initial favor; (2) "liking reciprocity" where you give something to a 
person because you like her or him (the liking can result from a gift you obtained from 
her before or from some other reason); (3) "continuation reciprocity" where you return 
a gift or favor and at the same time expect your gift to be returned again and so on 
                                                 
4
 Note that these explanations for the influence of respondent incentives on survey response rates are 
not mutually exclusive and that even within one respondent more than one processes may be at work 
(Shettle and Mooney 1999).  
7 
 
(Kolm 2006, pp. 421-422). The introductory gift in CVM surveys obviously aims at 
invoking the first category, i.e. compensatory reciprocity.  
 
2.2. Empirical evidence of the impact of respondent incentives in surveys 
Experimental studies done in the field of survey methodology so far robustly find 
incentives to raise response rates regardless of the administration mode of the 
survey with unconditional incentives performing better than conditional ones (Church 
1993, Simmons and Wilmot 2004, Singer et al. 1999, Teisl et al. 2006). Another 
regular finding is that cash incentives work better in decreasing overall nonresponse 
than in-kind incentives (Ryu et al. 2006, Singer et al. 1999). Ryu et al. (2006) explain 
this with the general usability of money compared to specific in-kind gifts. In addition, 
when employing the latter, researchers have to be careful when selecting the specific 
gift to be used, since its symbolic meaning may change according to different 
contexts and respondents (Weinreb et al. 1998). Regarding the effect of the value of 
the incentive on response rates, the empirical literature offers differing insights. While 
most studies have found that the higher the value of the incentive the higher the 
response rate (James and Bolstein 1990, Wetzels et al. 2008, Yu and Cooper 1983), 
other studies did not detect such a positive relationship (Hidano et al. 2005, Stratford 
et al. 2003). Concerning the quality of the data, there is much evidence that 
respondent incentives at least do not foster response bias and often improve 
response completeness and accuracy by reducing item non-response (James and 
Bolstein 1990, Shettle and Mooney 1999).  
Evidence of the fact that the norm of reciprocity provides a more plausible 
explanation of reciprocal behavior than a rational cost-benefit analysis is also 
provided by research in experimental economics. In this framework, several classical 
laboratory experiments can be employed to investigate why people behave 
reciprocally, such as the ultimatum game (e.g. Camerer and Thaler 1995), the gift-
exchange game (Alpizar et al. 2008, Falk 2007, Fehr et al. 1993, Nicklish and Salz 
2008), or the trust or investment game (Berg et al. 1995). Empirical evidence in all of 
these games shows that individuals regularly deviate from purely self-interested 
behavior and respond to kind actions of others with the same kind behavior. In a field 
experiment involving charitable donations, Falk (2007) mentions the “gift-exchange 
hypothesis” referring to the fact that donations can be expected to be more likely 
when a gift is provided with the charitable organization’s appeal for funds than when 
no gift is provided. The data support this hypothesis. In a field experiment involving 
contributions to a national park in Costa Rica, Alpizar et al. (2008) find that the 
8 
 
provision of small gifts only marginally increases voluntary contributions. Taking the 
cost of the gifts into account, the authors conclude that such a procedure is not 
economical from the perspective of the researcher.  
In the field of survey-based environmental valuation, the choice of the appropriate 
value of the incentive is very difficult because the researcher must avoid creating a 
feeling of coercion in the respondent by giving an amount that is far too high. This 
means that the norm of reciprocity must not become compulsion (Whittington 2004). 
Besides these ethical considerations, the behavioral effects of monetary and in-kind 
respondent compensation in environmental valuation surveys have received but little 
attention so far. In an experimental two-wave CVM study, Hidano et al. (2005) 
demonstrate the effects of reciprocity on respondent motivation and thus on their 
cognitive effort. In their study, reciprocity is induced by both an up-front payment to 
the respondent and by an especially nice and friendly treatment of the respondent by 
the surveyor. The results show that a high unconditional payment compared to a low 
payment significantly increases two out of four measures of respondents’ cognitive 
effort. However, these results were not compared to a sample without gift provision.  
 
2.3. Methodological approach of this study 
The present study aims at a systematic investigation of the consequences of 
providing respondent incentives in CVM surveys following the above mentioned five 
research questions. This study should provide a basis for the researchers’ decision 
whether to provide an incentive or not and, if yes, which kind of incentive. To this end, 
we adopt a field-experimental approach to study the influence of reciprocity on CVM 
survey responses. We employ a split-sample procedure with five different treatments 
randomly assigned to the respondents. In addition to a control group of respondents 
that did not receive an incentive (the base version), two treatments were 
administered with monetary incentives (high and low value cash amounts) and two 
split samples were administered with in-kind presents (high and low-value gifts 
equivalent in value to the two monetary incentives) (cf. figure 1). Within this 
experimental setting we then analyze the effects of the different treatments on a 
number of indicators for respondent effort, data quality and, finally, the WTP 
statement. 
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3. Empirical study 
3.1. Project description 
We apply our research approach in a CVM survey aiming at an assessment of the 
social value of the conversion of rubber plantations into natural forests in 
Xishuangbanna, Yunnan Province (southwest China) counteracting the widespread 
deforestation in that area. Deforestation as a result of rising demand of agricultural 
land is an often reported environmental problem. In the case of tropical Southeast 
Asia one of the main drivers of this development is the cultivation of rubber trees 
(Hevea brasiliensis). Xishuangbanna Prefecture, which is located at the 
southernmost rim of Yunnan Province in China, has also been witnessing this rapid 
expansion of rubber monocultures at the expense both of the formerly tropical 
rainforest coverage and traditional systems of shifting cultivation.  
As a consequence of the special climatic conditions of the area as a transition 
zone between the tropics and subtropics, Xishuangbanna abounds in plant and 
animal species and has long been recognized as a biodiversity hotspot. While it only 
accounts for 0.2% of the land area of the People’s Republic of China, the region is 
home to 25% of all plant species in the country (Xu 2006). The major part of the area 
is covered by different subtypes of tropical forest, which is the main ecological 
characteristic of that region. This flora and fauna make Xishuangbanna an 
ecologically and geographically special region in China. 
However, this traditional setting has been disturbed in recent years by the fast 
spreading of rubber monocultures. Since the price for natural rubber continues to be 
very high and since it is possible to cultivate rubber trees even on steep mountain 
slopes, more and more primary and secondary forest land has been transformed into 
rubber plantations. In addition to the undeniable economic benefits for the rubber 
farmers and the region as a whole, this trend, which has continued into the new 
century, entails a multitude of negative ecological and environmental consequences. 
First and foremost, the replacement of natural forests and traditional shifting 
agricultural land by both large-scale and small-scale rubber plantations leads to a 
huge loss of biodiversity (Ziegler et al. 2009). Moreover, the existence of 
monocultures threatens the whole hydrological system of the area. This includes the 
problem of increased precipitation run-off, which reduces rainwater infiltration (Ziegler 
et al. 2009), and the increased use of pesticides and chemical fertilizers in the 
plantations, which endangers water quality in local rivers and streams. The clearing 
of forest on sloped land further leads to soil erosion, increasing also the risk of 
landslides (Ziegler et al. 2009). Overall, it becomes clear that the economic benefits 
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of rubber cultivation, which are obvious in the region, are bought at an ever 
increasing ecological and environmental price.  
The scenario to be evaluated by respondents in the present study is a 
reforestation project implemented in a nearby nature reserve area. The ‘Return 
Rubber into Forest’ project as it is called in the survey was designed to resemble the 
sloping land conversion program (Bennett 2008), a policy measure implemented 
nationwide by the Chinese government and well known to the survey population. 
During the survey interview, respondents were informed that existing rubber 
plantations in the nature reserve area would be transformed back into forest and that 
the following consequences could be expected from this renaturation effort. Firstly, 
the original forest area would be partially restored, which would provide habitat for a 
number of rare plant and animal species. In addition, reforestation would lead to 
better water quality in local rivers because less pesticide would have to be brought 
out. This would further result in less pesticide contamination in agricultural food 
products and the whole local ecosystem.  
Subsequently, the payment vehicle is introduced. Respondents are informed that 
a fund would be set up by the local government, to which all citizens would have to 
contribute. The payments would have to be made every three months over a time-
span of five years. WTP statements have to be made on a payment card (PC). These 
payment specifications were the result of a number of in-depth interviews with local 
citizens and several rounds of so-called citizen expert group (CEG) meetings 
(Ahlheim et al. 2010). In these discussion meetings, features of the survey study and 
the questionnaire were discussed with a group of citizens who are representative of 
the survey population. Valuable insights could be gained regarding the structure and 
wording of the questionnaire as well as the type of gifts used for the reciprocity 
experiments.  
The questionnaire used for this survey consisted of five parts. After an 
introduction to the purpose of the study the first part contained questions regarding 
the respondent’s knowledge and familiarity with the environmental problem. After that, 
parts two and three introduced the project scenario and the payment scenario to the 
respondent, respectively. Part four, the elicitation questions, forms the core of the 
interview, in which the respondent was presented the PC and asked to indicate his 
maximum WTP for the proposed reforestation project. The last part consisted of a 
series of demographic and attitudinal questions that aim at an assessment of 
potential determinants of WTP.  
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3.2. Survey and treatment implementation 
The survey was conducted in early summer 2009. All interviews were carried out 
in-person by a group of local interviewers who were recruited and trained especially 
for the purpose of this survey. In order to ensure the representativeness of the results 
with respect to the overall population of the study area a random sample of 
households was drawn. The local government provided a complete list of all housing 
units in the urban area of Jinghong, indicating how many households reside in each 
unit. Based on these data a random list of addresses was generated and the 
interviewers were sent specifically to those designated addresses. In case the 
selected household could not be interviewed, interviewers were told to approach the 
neighboring household. Interviews were conducted seven days per week in the late 
afternoon and early evening when most people are at home. 
As to the monetary gifts, the specified amount of cash (30 RMB or 15 RMB) was 
handed to the respondent in an envelope. The two main criteria for the selection of 
suitable in-kind gifts were that they should be usable by all respondent households 
and that their value is sufficiently obvious to respondents. In discussions with local 
citizens during and after the CEG meetings it became clear that these criteria are 
fulfilled best by a 1kg bag of washing powder worth 15 RMB and a bath towel worth 
45 RMB.  
Value \ Type Monetary In-kind 
High 30 RMB Bath towel 
Low 15 RMB Washing powder 
Figure 1: Classification of respondent gifts 
In those treatments where a gift was provided, respondents were informed about 
this in the introduction to the interview and the gift was shown to them. The gift was 
handed over regardless of whether the interview was completed or not, i.e. as an 
unconditional incentive. Especially in the rather rural districts of the survey area we 
faced the risk that news about the provision of gifts might spread while the survey is 
still being conducted. In order to avoid such biasing effects, interviews in those 
districts were completed in a single day with an appropriately high number or 
interviewers working simultaneously. The aim of this procedure was to prevent that 
respondents who already know about the gifting would expect any type of 
compensation when accepting to be interviewed. Altogether, it was planned to 
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conduct a total of 1,000 interviews equally distributed among the 5 treatments, i.e. 
200 interviews per treatment.  
 
3.3. Hypotheses under investigation 
Treatment effects are the differences in experimental outcomes with and without 
treatment and can have different forms. Consequently, the influence of respondent 
incentives in a CVM context can be analyzed with respect to a range of criteria. The 
overall objective should be to find that type of interview setting (i.e. respondent gift) 
which increases respondents’ level of thought and resulting data quality but leaves 
their WTP statements unbiased, i.e. leads to truthful WTP answers. In the 
introduction and in section 2 we discussed the way respondent incentives might 
invoke reciprocal behavior and thus might pressurize the respondent who has 
received a gift prior to the interview to “pay something back” when completing the 
questionnaire. At this point the question arises, which strategies of “paying back” 
respondents actually use. In this study we consider three different kinds of possible 
reciprocal behavior of CVM respondents: 
Behavior 1: Respondents are motivated by the incentive to put more effort into 
answering also difficult questions. 
Behavior 2: Respondents do not value the presented scenario at all but, 
nevertheless, feel obliged now by the material incentive to state a positive WTP 
instead of zero. 
Behavior 3: Respondents who would state a positive WTP even without material 
incentives now feel obliged by the incentive to state a higher than their true WTP. 
Behavior (1) is intended by providing material incentives to respondents: It leads 
to an increase in the response rates of sensitive and cognitively challenging 
questions and possibly to better reflected answers. This reduction of item non-
response increases the data quality of the survey. This behavior will be measured by 
a comparison of the response rates of such questions across the 5 treatments. 
Behavior 1 corresponds with research questions (1) to (4) explained in the 
introduction in section 1. Behaviors (2) and (3), in contrast, are undesired and should 
be avoided. They represent biases of stated WTP since respondents report a higher 
than their true WTP. These two kinds of behavior correspond with research question 
(5) in section 1.  
To scrutinize the effects of behaviors (2) and (3) we will compare stated WTP 
across treatments, i.e. the fraction of zero responses, mean WTP and the distribution 
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of WTP statements. Adopting a positive perspective on the reciprocal behavior of 
respondents in CVM surveys, we want to test the following three hypotheses which 
refer to the three kinds of behavior mentioned above: 
(H1) Both monetary and in-kind incentives increase the effort respondents put into 
answering the questionnaire.  
(H2) The provision of monetary as well as in-kind incentives increases the 
likelihood that people state a positive WTP as compared to the base treatment 
without such incentives. 
(H3) The provision of monetary and in-kind incentives increases the average stated 
WTP as compared to the base treatment without such incentives. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Socio-demographic characteristics of the split samples 
As shown in table 1 our survey falls slightly short of the planned number of interviews 
due to some unusable datasets in every treatment. The table also displays means 
and standard deviations of major household characteristics across the four 
treatments and the control group.5 While mean number of household members, level 
of education, household income in RMB and the fraction of male respondents do not 
differ significantly, the Kruskal-Wallis test rejects the null hypothesis of equal means 
for respondent age at the 1%-level and number of children at the 5%-level of 
confidence. That means that except for these household characteristics the five split 
samples do not differ significantly.  
 
4.2. The influence of incentives on respondents’ effort 
As mentioned above, a criterion frequently applied to test the influence of 
respondent incentives is the response rate to certain questions in the survey. The 
upper part of table 2 provides response rates to sensitive questions asking for the 
WTP statement, household income and ethnicity of the respondent. Correspondingly, 
the lower part of table 2 shows the fractions of respondents who have completed all 
items of cognitively challenging question sets, such as the evaluation of the single 
                                                 
5
 A list of all variables employed in this study including descriptions, sample means and standard 
deviations is provided in table A.1 in the appendix.  
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scenario elements, environmental attitudes or a psychological scale to assess the 
respondents’ propensity to answer in a socially desirable manner.6 It can be seen that 
for all questions under investigation response rates are higher in the incentive 
treatments compared to the control group, albeit not all differences are significant. 
Looking only at significant increases in response rates, the low monetary treatment 
shows the best results. Except for the elicitation question, four rises in response rates 
are significant as compared to the control group. Although the other incentive 
treatments lead to a significantly higher response rate for the WTP question, there 
are fewer significant differences regarding the other questions.  
Table 1: Household demographics across the treatments (Chi-squared and Kruskal-
Wallis Tests) 
                                                 
6
 The propensity of a respondent to answer to survey questions in a socially desirable manner is 
assessed by a modified version of the Balanced Inventory for Desirable Responding (BIDR) (cf. 
Paulhus 1991).  
           Kruskal-Wallis test 
  Control 15 RMB 30 RMB Powder Towel Chi² df p-value 
N 196 194 185 196 198    
Age 38.05 35.92 33.82 36.96 34.90 17456 4 0.002 
(std. dev.) (0.89) (0.89) (0.88) (0.83) (0.79)    
Househ. members 3.18 3.24 3.09 3.36 3.03 6001 4 0.199 
(std. dev.) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)    
Children 0.95 0.86 0.74 1.02 0.82 12940 4 0.012 
(std. dev.) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)    
Education 3.98 3.91 3.92 3.98 3.96 556 4 0.968 
(std. dev.) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09)    
Household income 3001 3003 2646 2465 2698 5881 4 0.208 
(std. dev.) (175) (217) (152) (134) (165)    
            
  Control 15 RMB 30 RMB Powder Towel df 
Chi² 
asymp. 
Sig. 
exact 
Sig. 
Male 0.48 0.41 0.38 0.44 0.49 4 0.128 0.129 
s.d. (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.035) (0.04)       
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These results support our hypothesis (H1) in that we can observe a significant 
effect of the incentives on respondent efforts as measured by significantly decreasing 
item nonresponse rates. A comparison of the different incentive treatments suggests 
that this effect is largest under the low-value monetary incentive (15 RMB) and in 
general rather limited under the in-kind incentive treatments. 
Sensitive question  Control 15 RMB   p 30 RMB   p Powder   p Towel   p 
WTP question 97.0% 98.0% 
 
0.544 99.5% 
 
0.072 99.5% 
 
0.059 99.5% 
 
0.061 
Household income 86.1% 93.4%* 0.016 90.3%
 
0.204 90.4%
 
0.192 91.0%
 
0.131 
Ethnic group 98.5% 100.0%  0.086 98.9%  0.722 99.0%  0.674 99.0%  0.666 
              Question set  Control 15 RMB   p 30 RMB   p Powder   p Towel   p 
Scenario evaluation 96.5% 99.5% * 0.035 99.5% * 0.043 99.0% 
 
0.100 99.0% 
 
0.097 
Scenario rating 98.0% 100.0% * 0.047 100.0% 
 
0.054 99.5%
 
0.187 99.0%
 
0.423 
Env. Attitudes 87.1% 92.4% 
 
0.081 93.5%* 0.034 89.3%
 
0.495 93.5%* 0.032 
Social desirability 82.7% 90.4%* 0.024 87.6%  0.172 87.8%  0.149 87.9%  0.137 
Table 2: Response rates to sensitive and cognitively challenging questions (p-values 
for t- / U-Tests in comparison to the control group) 
 
4.3. The influence of incentives on stated WTP 
Next, we analyze the effect of incentive provision on WTP statements, mean WTP 
and the form of WTP distribution across treatments. Table 3 shows the estimates of 
mean WTP for the five treatments. While the low cash amount of 15 RMB in the 
LO_MONEY treatment exhibits virtually the same mean WTP as the control group, 
mean WTP estimates in all other treatments differ, however only the lower WTP of 
the low in-kind treatment (LO_INKIND) in comparison to the control group is 
significant. As we see from table 3, mean WTP of the HI_MONEY and the 
HI_INKIND treatment are higher than mean WTP of the control group, but the 
differences to the control group are not significant. 
Greater and significant differences can be observed for the fraction of zero-WTP 
statements across the treatments. Here, it shows that all incentive treatments exhibit 
a lower fraction of zero responses as compared to the control group, most of which 
are quite drastic. Yet, except in the low in-kind treatment no significant effect on the 
fraction of zero responses is observed. Thus, the information contained in table 3 is 
16 
 
somewhat inconclusive. While according to the hypothesis (H2) stated above no 
significant increase in mean WTP compared to the control group is observed (we 
even see a significant decrease for the low in-kind treatment), there seems to be a 
strong effect on the propensity of respondents to state positive versus zero WTP 
amounts when confronted with an incentive. It is, therefore, necessary to analyze the 
WTP responses across the 5 treatments in more detail. Figure 2 displays the relative 
frequencies of WTP statements for each treatment separately.  
Treatment N mean WTP Fraction of zero-WTP statements 
Control group 196 41.17 
 
21.94% 
 LO_MONEY (15 RMB) 194 40.66
 
12.37%* 
HI_MONEY (30 RMB) 185 46.22
 
8.11% ** 
LO_INKIND (Washing powder) 196 29.06* 19.90% 
 HI_INKIND (Bath towel) 198 43.35  13.13%* 
Table 3: Mean WTP estimates and zero-WTP responses across treatments. The 1%- 
(**) and 5%-significance levels (*) indicate significant differences of the fraction of 
zero-WTP statements in the treatments in comparison to the control group. 
Figure 2: Relative distribution of WTP responses 
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An econometric model of the two-step decision of WTP 
In order to account for the two potential biasing behaviors (2) and (3) we apply a 
special regression model. Here, it is assumed that the respondent selects a specific 
WTP amount in a two-step decision process. As a first step, he decides whether to 
state a positive WTP or to state zero. In case, the respondent is generally willing to 
pay for the proposed project, he selects the specific amount in the second step of the 
decision process. The determinants of the decision process either to select a positive 
amount or not may well be different from the ones of deciding about the specific WTP 
amount. This is especially the case when respondents are given an incentive since, 
as explained above, it may lead either to behavior (2) or (3) or even both. The 
appropriate estimation model to detect the two separate sets of determinants of both 
processes is a two-step selection model based on Heckman (1979). By applying this 
approach it is possible to simultaneously estimate the respective factors that 
influence the two decision processes of stating WTP. The model can be written as 
follows (cf. Heckman 1979, Greene 2003): 
  
         (1) 
with 
   {
         
   
          
   
 (2) 
    
                if zi = 1 (3) 
where  
              
    
       (4) 
Equation (1) is the so-called selection equation and models whether respondent i 
chooses a positive WTP (zi = 1) or zero WTP (zi = 0). The vector    denotes the 
variables explaining the selection process and   the respective coefficients 
(determinants). Equation (3), often termed outcome equation, models the specific 
(positive) WTP amount yi stated by respondent i, the vector    denotes the 
explanatory variables and   the respective coefficients of this process.    stands for 
the correlation coefficient between the error terms in both equations,    and   . The 
expected WTP given that it is positive can then be modeled jointly and can be 
expressed as 
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    |  
               (       ) (5) 
with   (       )   (      )  (      )  denoting the inverse Mill’s ratio. 
Estimating equation (5) then yields both the coefficient estimates   of the outcome 
equation as well as the coefficients   of the selection equation in a joint estimation 
process. From these coefficient estimates the potential influences of behaviors (2) 
and (3) on stated WTP can be analyzed. For both sets of coefficients the marginal 
effects can be computed, as well.  
 
Results of the two-step model for reciprocity 
As already shown in table 3 the relative frequency of zero-WTP responses is 
lower in all treatments as compared to the control group. Obviously, the provision of a 
gift increases the likelihood of observing behavior (2), i.e. stating a positive WTP 
amount. This increase (corresponding to a lower fraction of responses in the first 
interval) is most pronounced in the high-value monetary treatment (HI_MONEY). 
From figure 2 it can now well be observed that these reduced fractions of zero-WTP 
statements consistently correspond to much higher frequencies of responses in the 
first positive interval on the payment card, i.e. 1-5 RMB, when incentives are used. 
We can even observe that now the responses in this interval have the highest relative 
frequency of the whole WTP distribution in every incentive treatment. From this 
observation it must be concluded that the use of incentives significantly induces 
some respondents not to state a zero-WTP (which they would have stated in the 
case of no incentives) and shift their response into the first interval of positive WTP 
amounts. Thus, we clearly observe behavior (2) in our treatments, however, the 
consequences of this behavior appear to be negligible since the induced shift of WTP 
statements is very small.  
The results concerning the assumed behavior (3) are more complex. Therefore, in 
a next step we will analyze the decision to state a positive WTP and on the specific 
WTP amount jointly in a Heckman two-step model as laid out above. In this model we 
aim to identify the determinants that drive the two processes and investigate whether 
they differ systematically. 
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  Model 1 Model 2 
  N = 892 N = 679 
  Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Outcome equation: dependent variable: WTP interval midpoint  
AGE -0.414  0.163 -0.415  0.251 
MALE 3.553 
 
0.567 3.287 
 
0.662 
MARRIED -13.145
 
0.059 -15.345
 
0.073 
CHILD 
   
10.531
 
0.214 
SATIS 
   
11.451* 0.036 
EDUCATION 6.954* 0.013 8.930 ** 0.008 
INCOME 0.006 ** 0.000 0.005 ** 0.005 
UNCONCERN 
   
3.525 
 
0.368 
INSTRUMENT 
   
-4.318
 
0.224 
EMOCARE 
   
-4.409
 
0.340 
OBJECTIVE 
   
-2.077
 
0.553 
LO_MONEY -8.450
 
0.445 -9.454
 
0.426 
HI_MONEY -6.241
 
0.618 -6.813
 
0.574 
LO_INKIND -18.048
 
0.072 -19.642
 
0.097 
HI_INKIND -4.327
 
0.690 -3.372
 
0.774 
CONSTANT 36.014
 
0.110 -9.474
 
0.735 
Selection equation: dependent variable: posWTP       
HHHEAD       0.257 
 
0.081 
TAXES 
   
-0.655** 0.000 
MALE 
   
-0.368 ** 0.007 
SATIS 
   
0.245 ** 0.009 
UNCONCERN 
   
-0.131 * 0.022 
EMOCARE 
   
0.208 ** 0.000 
LO_MONEY 0.388* 0.013 0.534 * 0.011 
HI_MONEY 0.623 ** 0.000 0.737 ** 0.001 
LO_INKIND 0.048 
 
0.741 0.111 
 
0.554 
HI_INKIND 0.352* 0.022 0.375
 
0.054 
CONSTANT 0.723 ** 0.000 0.262
 
0.514 
rho 0.000    0.010    
Test_rho 1.000    0.963    
Table 4: Two-step regression models of WTP statements 
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Table 4 displays the results of two different model specifications. In these models 
the independent variable, posWTP , in the selection equation is equal to one if the 
respondent states a positive WTP and zero for respondents selecting “0 RMB”. The 
dependent variable of the second step model, the outcome equation, is the midpoint 
of the PC interval selected by the respective respondent. The left-hand side of the 
table (model 1) is a basic model including in the selection equation only the treatment 
dummies. It turns out that all coefficients except the one of the low-valued in-kind gift 
treatment are significantly positive, meaning that the probability of stating a positive 
WTP response is significantly higher in the two monetary and in the high-valued in-
kind gift treatments compared to the control group. This result confirms the 
observation in figure 2, that these three treatments substantially reduce the fraction of 
zero responses relative to the control group without incentive. 
Table 5 shows the marginal effects of this selection model, i.e. the extent to which 
the likelihood of stating a positive WTP amount changes from providing no incentive 
in the base version to providing an incentive in the respective treatment. As can be 
seen the provision of the high-value monetary incentive clearly has the strongest 
impact on the likelihood of stating a positive WTP. The quantitative impact of the 
small money amount is approximately equal to that of the high-value in-kind gift. A 
comparison of only the monetary gifts reveals that the high amount exhibits a much 
stronger effect on posWTP than the low money amount. This shows that there is a 
clear and strong positive relationship between the value of the monetary incentive 
and the likelihood of stating a positive WTP.  
  Model 1 Model 2 
  Effect   p-value Effect 
 
 p-value 
HHHEAD 
   
0.050 
 
0.080 
TAXES 
   
-0.128** 0.000 
MALE 
   
-0.072 ** 0.006 
SATIS 
   
0.048 ** 0.008 
UNCONCERN 
   
-0.026 * 0.020 
EMOCARE 
   
0.041 ** 0.000 
LO_MONEY 0.094 * 0.012 0.104 ** 0.010 
HI_MONEY 0.151 ** 0.000 0.144 ** 0.001 
LO_INKIND 0.012 
 
0.741 0.022 
 
0.555 
HI_INKIND 0.085* 0.021 0.073
 
0.052 
Table 5: Marginal effects of the first-step selection model 
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Looking at the outcome equation of model 1 in table 4, the effect of certain 
demographic variables on the amount of WTP can be seen. While the level of 
education (EDU) and household income (INCOME) as expected have a significantly 
positive influence, the fact that the respondent is married (MARRIED) has a negative 
effect on WTP, which is a somewhat surprising and unusual result in the context of 
the valuation of environmental goods. Concerning the different incentive treatments, 
it turns out that merely the low-value in-kind incentive affects stated WTP amounts 
negatively, i.e. respondents in this treatment state systematically lower WTPs than 
those in the control group. No significant effect on the specific WTP amount can be 
found for the remaining three gift treatments. The important result here is that 
although these incentives increase the likelihood of stating a positive WTP (as shown 
in the selection equation) they do not significantly influence the specific amount once 
the decision to state a positive WTP has been made.  
To check for the robustness of these results we extend the regression model and 
include a larger set of explanatory variables both in the selection and the outcome 
equation (model 2). Regarding the selection equation, the likelihood of stating a 
positive WTP is positively influenced by the fact that the respondent is the head of 
the household (HHHEAD), the overall level of life satisfaction (SATIS) and the 
environmental attitude factor EMOCARE. The latter taps a feeling of emotional care 
for the natural environment in the respondent. On the contrary, the fact that 
respondents think that local residents are already paying enough taxes (TAXES), the 
respondent is male (MALE) and the environmental attitude factor UNCONCERN 
significantly lower the probability of stating a positive WTP. The latter factor assesses 
the degree to which a respondent is mindlessly unconcerned about current 
environmental problems. In the outcome equation in the upper part of table 4, among 
the newly included explanatory variables only the level of life satisfaction has a 
significant effect. It turns out that the more satisfied the respondent is with his life, the 
higher is his stated WTP. Both from a general perspective and regarding the effects 
of the incentive treatments, model 2 confirms the findings of the first model. The fact 
that the same pattern of significant dummy variables can be found when including 
further explanatory variables into the model is evidence for the robustness of the 
above results. 
 
Further aspects of reciprocal behavior 
While in our field experiments we found evidence of behavior (2) but not of 
behavior (3) we want to investigate a further aspect that emerged from an 
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observation of the WTP distribution graphs of each single treatment (figure 2). The 
distribution of the HI_MONEY treatment where respondents were given an up-front 
incentive of 30 RMB shows a peak at the 26-35 RMB interval which appears only in 
this treatment. This observation leads to the suspicion that some respondents were 
especially attracted to select the interval as their WTP that corresponds to the paid 
incentive, at least at first sight. Those respondents may have had the intention to pay 
back the amount received as incentive. We term this effect “direct reciprocation”. 
Ironically, such thinking clearly results in a behavioral fallacy since the payment 
scenario explains that the stated amounts are to be paid every three months over the 
next five years, i.e. those respondents would agree to paying back 20 times as much 
as they received as an incentive. 
We test this hypothesis with a probit model where the variable BID30, i.e. a binary 
variable indicating whether the respondent has chosen the interval around 30 RMB, 
is used as the dependent variable. In this simple model which is shown in table 6 we 
regress the respective variable on the different treatment dummies in order to test 
whether indeed the interval containing the 30 RMB incentive amount was chosen 
significantly more often in the HI_MONEY treatment. The result support this 
hypothesis since, as expected, we find that in in the BID30-model only the 
HI_MONEY dummy has a significant effect. 
Dependent variable: BID30 
 N = 969 Coeff. p-value 
LO_MONEY 0.103 
 
0.629 
HI_MONEY 0.558** 0.004 
LO_INKIND 0.182 
 
0.381 
HI_INKIND 0.093
 
0.663 
CONSTANT -1.686** 0.000 
Pseudo R-squared 0.023    
Table 6: The direct reciprocation effect 
Thus, we show that in our study the specific incentive amount can serve as an 
attractor for some respondents (here about 9% of respondents) when selecting their 
individual WTP amounts on the payment card. This behavior, even if it is rationalized 
by the noble intention to pay back the amount received as an incentive to participate 
in the survey, is rather surprising since it leads to a drastic overpayment due to the 
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repeated payment schedule. At this point, direct reciprocation needs to be regard as 
a preliminary and tentative hypothesis and it needs to be investigated whether it can 
be replicated in future CVM surveys using monetary incentives. 
  
5. Discussion and conclusions 
In this study we wanted to scrutinize the effects of material incentives on respondent 
behavior in CVM surveys. Experimental as well as model-based theoretical studies 
found in the literature show contradictory results regarding the effects of material 
incentives on the compliance of candidates in experiments who are asked to fulfill 
some specific task. CVM surveys represent a principal-agent setting where 
interviewers are the principals who ask respondents (the agents) to answer their 
questions as conscientiously and truthfully as possible. Like in the traditional 
principal-agent model the efforts of respondents cannot be judged directly by the 
principals. Therefore, we took the fact whether certain more complicated questions 
were answered or not as an indicator for respondent conscientiousness. We 
confronted four different incentive treatments (low money payment, high money 
payment, low-price in-kind gift, high-price in-kind gift) with the performance of a 
control group where no material incentives were provided. Based on five research 
questions which resulted from the respective literature we analyzed respondent 
reactions to material incentives provided before a CVM interview.  
Our results regarding respondent compliance in terms of item non-response are as 
mixed as could be expected from the literature. The best performance in the sense of 
the lowest item non-response rate was reached by the low money payment of 15 
RMB. This performance was significantly better than the control group in most items 
at the 5% level and in all items at the 10% level. The performance of the high money 
payment (30 RMB) was worse than that of the low money treatment but still in two 
items better than the control group at the 5% significance level and in four items 
better than the control group at the 10% level. The high-value in-kind gift (towel) 
performed significantly better than the control group at the 5% level in only one item 
and at the 10% level in three items followed by the low-value in-kind gift which 
surpassed the control group in only one item at the 10% level. So we have a clear 
ranking with the low money payment treatment showing the best performance 
followed by the high money payment and the high-value in-kind gift, while the low-
value-in-kind gift shows no effect at all at the 5% significance level as compared to 
the control group and only one at the 10% level.  
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Answering our first research question ("Do extrinsic incentives trigger respondents' 
efforts in answering CVM questions?") we can say that all but one respondent 
incentives have a significantly positive effect on respondent compliance in the sense 
that they tend to lower the item non-response rate as compared to the control group. 
This means that from our study we cannot confirm the wide-spread crowding-out 
hypothesis for CVM surveys, since none of the treatments with a material incentive 
lead to a worse performance as compared to the control group. Instead it seems that 
traditional reciprocity considerations and feelings of gratitude determine respondents' 
reactions to the incentives offered.  
Regarding the second research question ("What has a more favorable effect on 
respondents' diligence in answering CVM questionnaires, money or in-kind gifts?") 
we find that money shows a better performance than in-kind gifts of the same value. 
This demonstrates that the doubts regarding money as an incentive arising from 
other contexts (cf. Heyman and Ariely 2004 or Gneezy et al. 2011) cannot be 
confirmed for CVM surveys, at least not from our study.  
With respect to the third research question ("Do large money incentives on the one 
hand and small money incentives on the other have different effects on respondents' 
diligence in answering CVM questionnaires?") our explanations are not as clear and 
convincing as before. From our study we cannot confirm the advice of Gneezy and 
Rustichini (2000) "Pay enough or don’t pay at all" for CVM surveys. While they found 
in a different experimental environment that no payment performs best, followed by 
the high payment before the low payment, in our study the low money payment 
shows the best performance regarding respondent compliance and is followed by 
high money payment, while both perform better than no monetary incentive at all. 
The fact that any money incentive is better than no incentive at all can be explained 
by reciprocity considerations, but it is rather unclear why the 'basic law of behavior' 
according to which "higher incentives will lead to more effort and higher performance" 
does not seem to hold here. Maybe there are some unknown psychological effects at 
work here but they could not be identified from our data.  
Things are different with respect to research question 4 ("Do expensive in-kind 
incentives on the one hand and less expensive in-kind incentives on the other have 
different effects on respondents' diligence in answering CVM questionnaires?"). Here 
the high-value in-kind gift has a much more favorable effect on respondent 
compliance than the low-value gift, which is in accordance with the "basic law of 
behavior" as well as with reciprocity considerations.  
While our recommendations derived from research questions 1 to 4 are rather clear 
("Use a low money payment as an incentive to trigger respondent compliance in 
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CVM surveys") we have not yet taken into account possible effects of compliance 
incentives on stated WTP in the sense of research question 5 ("Do material 
incentives (monetary or in-kind) affect respondents' stated WTP for the public project 
under discussion?"). Here we find that the low money payment treatment leads to 
practically the same average WTP as the control group while the high money 
payment treatment and the high-value in-kind gift treatment lead to higher average 
stated WTP than the control group, though these differences are not significant. Most 
surprising is the effect of the low-value in-kind gift on average WTP which is 
significantly lower than that of the control group. One possible explanation is that the 
choice of the low-value gift (washing powder) was inappropriate and that this gift was 
perceived as a kind of insult so that respondents "paid us back" by understating their 
true WTP. This shows how important thorough pretesting is when CVM surveys are 
conducted in foreign cultures.  
Summing up, from our study we derive the recommendation to use moderate money 
payments as incentives to motivate respondents to answer CVM questions 
conscientiously, so that item non-response rates are minimized. We urgently 
recommend thorough pretesting in order to assess an amount of money considered 
appropriate by respondents, since this amount will differ between different social and 
cultural environments. In contrast to other studies, in our survey in-kind gifts turned 
out to be much less helpful as incentives than money payments. Also the choice of 
the "right" in-kind gift seems to be much more difficult than we expected, so that 
moderate money payments are our first choice as respondent incentives in CVM 
surveys.  
 
 
References 
Ahlheim, M., Ekasingh, B., Frör, O., Kitchaicharoen, J., Neef, A., Sangkapitux, C. and 
Sinphurmsukskul, N. (2010): Better than their reputation: Enhancing the validity of 
contingent valuation mail survey results through citizen expert groups, Journal of 
Environmental Planning and Management, 53, 163-182. 
Alpizar, F., Carlsson, F. and Johansson-Stenman, O. (2008): Anonymity, reciprocity, 
and conformity: Evidence from voluntary contributions to a national park in Costa 
Rica, Journal of Public Economics, 92, 1047-1060. 
Bennett, M. T. (2008): China's sloping land conversion program: Institutional 
innovation or business as usual?, Ecological Economics, 65(4), 699-711. 
26 
 
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J. and McCabe, K. (1995): Trust, reciprocity, and social history, 
Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 122-142. 
Biner, P. M. and Kidd, H. J. (1994): The interactive effects of monetary incentive 
justification and questionnaire length on mail survey response rates, Psychology 
and Marketing, 11, 483-492. 
Bolton, G. E. and Ockenfels, A. (2000): ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and 
competition, The American Economic Review, 90, 166-193. 
Camerer, C. and Thaler, R. H. (1995): Anomalies: Ultimatums, dictators and manners, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 209-219. 
Church, A. H. (1993): Estimating the effects of incentives on mail-survey response 
rates: A meta-analysis, Public Opinion Quarterly, 57, 62-79. 
Dufwenberg, M. and Kirchsteiger, G. (2004): A theory of sequential reciprocity, 
Games and Economic Behavior, 47, 268-298. 
Falk, A. (2007): Gift exchange in the field, Econometrica, 75, 1501-1511. 
Fehr, E. and Gächter, S. (2000): Fairness and retaliation: The economics of 
reciprocity The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14, 159-181. 
Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G. and Riedl, A. (1993): Does fairness prevent market clearing? 
An experimental investigation, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, 437-459. 
Fehr, E. and Schmidt, K. M. (1999): A theory of fairness, competition, and 
cooperation, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 817-868. 
Frey, B. S. (1994), How Intrinsic Motivation Is Crowded in and out, Rationality and 
Society, 6, 334-352. 
Frey, B. S., and F. Oberholzer-Gee (1997), The Cost of Price Incentives: An 
Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-out, American Economic Review, 87, 
746-755. 
Frey, B. S., F. Oberholzer-Gee, and R. Eichenberger (1996), The Old Lady Visits 
your Backyard: A Tale of Morals and Markets, Journal of Political Economy, 104, 
1297-1313. 
Gneezy, U., Meier, S., Rey-Biel, P. (2011), When and Why Incentives (Don’t) Work to 
Modify Behavior, Economic Perspectives 25(4), 191-210.  
Gneezy, U., Rustichini, A. (2000), Pay enough or don’t pay at all, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 115(3), 791-810. 
27 
 
Gouldner, A. W. (1960): The norm of reciprocity: A preliminary statement, American 
Sociological Review, 25, 161-178. 
Greene, W. H. (2003): Econometric analysis, 5th edition, Upper Saddle River. 
Heckman, J. J. (1979): Sample selection bias as a specification error, Econometrica, 
47, 153-161. 
Heyman, J., and Ariely, D. (2004), Effort for Payment: A Tale of Two Markets. 
Psychological Science, 15(11): 787–793. 
Hidano, N., Kato, T. and Izumi, K. (2005): Reciprocity, consequentiality and 
willingness-to-pay in contingent valuation: An experimental panel analysis on 
climate changes. Working paper Tokyo Institute of Technology. 
James, J. M. and Bolstein, R. (1990): The effect of monetary incentives and follow-up 
mailings on the response rate and response quality in mail surveys, Public 
Opinion Quarterly, 54, 346-361. 
Kolm, S.C. (2006), Reciprocity: its scope, rationales, and consequences, in: Kolm, 
S.C. and Ythier, J. M. (eds.), Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and 
reciprocity, vol. 1, 371-541. 
Liberman, V., Steven M. S., Ross, L. (2004), “The Name of the Game: Predictive 
Power of Reputations versus Situational Labels in Determining Prisoner’s 
Dilemma Game Moves.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(9): 1175–
1185. 
Nicklish, A. and Salz, T. (2008): Reciprocity and status in a virtual field experiment. 
Working paper MPI for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn. 
Paulhus, D. L. (1991): Measurement and control of response bias, in: Robinson, J.P., 
Shaver, P.R. and Wrightsman, L.S. (eds.) Measures of personality and social 
psychological attitudes, 17-59, San Diego. 
Rabin, M. (1993): Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics, The 
American Economic Review, 83, 1281-1302. 
Ryu, E., Couper, M. P. and Marans, R. W. (2006): Survey incentives: Cash vs. in-
kind; face-to-face vs. mail; response rate vs. nonresponse error, International 
Journal of Public Opinion Research, 18, 89-106. 
Schwartz, B. (1967): The social psychology of the gift, American Journal of Sociology, 
73, 1-11. 
Shettle, C. and Mooney, G. (1999): Monetary incentives in U.S. government surveys, 
Journal of Official Statistics, 15, 231-250. 
28 
 
Simmons, E. and Wilmot, A. (2004): Incentive payments on social surveys: A 
literature review, Social Survey Methodology Bulletin, 53, 1-11. 
Singer, E., Van Hoewyk, J., Gebler, N., Raghunathan, T. and McGonagle, K. (1999): 
The effect of incentives on response rates in interviewer-mediated surveys, 
Journal of Official Statistics, 15, 217-230. 
Stratford, N., Simmonds, N. and Nicolaas, G. (2003): National travel survey 2002:  
Incentives experiment report. UK Department for Transport, London. 
Teisl, M. F., Roe, B. and Vayda, M. E. (2006): Incentive effects on response rates, 
data quality, and survey administration costs, International Journal of Public 
Opinion Research, 18, 364-373. 
Weinreb, A. A., Madhavan, S. and Stern, P. (1998): "The gift received has to be 
repaid:" Respondents, researchers and gifting. Conference paper at the Annual 
Meeting of the Eastern Sociological Society, Philadelphia. 
Wetzels, W., Schmeets, H., van den Brakel, J. and Feskens, R. (2008): Impact of 
prepaid incentives in face-to-face surveys: A large-scale experiment with postage 
stamps, International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 20, 507-516. 
Whittington, D. (2004): Ethical issues with contingent valuation surveys in developing 
countries: A note on informed consent and other concerns, Environmental and 
Resource Economics, 28, 507-515. 
Xu, J. (2006): The political, social, and ecological transformation of a landscape, 
Mountain Research and Development, 26, 254-262. 
Yu, J. and Cooper, H. (1983): A quantitative review of research design effects on 
response rates to questionnaires, Journal of Marketing Research, 20, 36-44. 
Ziegler, A. D., Fox, J. M. and Xu, J. (2009): The rubber juggernaut, Science, 324, 
1024-1025. 
 
 
  
29 
 
Appendix 
Table A.1: Description of variables used in the regression models 
 
 
Variable Description Mean Std. dev. 
AGE Age of the respondent 35.96 12.051 
MALE Gender of the respondent (1 = male, 0 = female) .44 .497 
MARRIED Marital status of the respondent (1 = married, 0 = not married) .62 .486 
CHILD Does the respondent have a child (1 = yes, 0 = no) .66 .475 
SATIS Level of overall live satisfaction 3.21 .674 
EDUCATION Level of education  3.95 1.202 
INCOME Household income  2,764 2,295 
UNCONCERN Environmental attitude factor: No concern for environmental 
problems 
.05 1.027 
INSTRUMENT Environmental attitude factor: Seeing primarily the instrumental 
value of the natural environment 
-.05 1.033 
EMOCARE Environmental attitude factor: Caring for the environment on an 
emotional level 
.05 .995 
OBJECTIVE Environmental attitude factor: Objectively acknowledging the 
existence of environmental problems 
.00 .999 
LO_MONEY Treatment dummy: low-valued monetary gift (15 RMB) - - 
HI_MONEY Treatment dummy: high-valued monetary gift (30 RMB) - - 
LO_INKIND Treatment dummy: low-valued in-kind gift (washing powder) - - 
HI_INKIND Treatment dummy: high-valued in-kind gift (bath towel) - - 
HHHEAD The respondent is the household head (1 = yes, 0 = no) - - 
TAXES “Taxes and fees of residents in Jinghong are already so high 
that there should be no additional financial burden.” (1 = yes, 0 
= no) 
1.38 .486 
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